Abstract. A reasonably efficient password based key exchange (KE) protocol with provable security without random oracle was recently proposed by Katz, et al. [18] and later by Gennaro and Lindell [13] . However, these protocols do not support mutual authentication (MA). The authors explained that this could be achieved by adding an additional flow. But then this protocol turns out to be 4-round. As it is known that a high entropy secret based key exchange protocol with MA 1 is optimally 3-round (otherwise, at least one entity is not authenticated since a replay attack is applicable), it is quite interesting to ask whether such a protocol in the password setting (without random oracle) is achievable or not. In this paper 2 , we provide an affirmative answer with an efficient construction in the common reference string (CRS) model. Our protocol is even simpler than that of Katz, et al. Furthermore, we show that our protocol is secure under the DDH assumption (without random oracle).
Introduction
In the area of secure communications, key exchange (KE) is one of the most important issues. In this scenario, two interactive parties are assumed to hold long-term secrets. Through an interactive procedure, they establish a temporary session key and then use it to encrypt and authenticate the subsequent communication. There are two types of KE protocols in the literature. In the first case, each party holds a high entropy secret (e.g., a signing key of a digital signature). Research along this line has been well studied, see [1, 6, 8, 12] . The other case is a password authenticated key exchange protocol (see [20] for a detailed description), in which it is assumed that the two parties only share a human-memorable (low entropy) password. Unlike a high entropy secret, it is believed that an exhaustive search attack (or a dictionary attack) is feasible. In fact, it is this attack that makes a construction of a secure password based KE protocol more difficult than the high entropy secret based one.
Related Work
Password authenticated key exchange was first studied by Bellovin and Merritt [4] . Since then, it has been extensively studied in literature [5, 16] . However, none of these solutions had provable security. The first effort to achieve provable security was due to Lucks [19] . Halevi and Krawczyk [15] proposed a password KE protocol in an asymmetric setting: a user only holds a password while the server additionally has a private key of a public key cryptosystem. Password KE protocols without this asymmetric assumption were proposed in [2, 7] . However, these protocols including [19] were proved in the random oracle model. It is known [9] that a random oracle based cryptographic construction could be insecure when the oracle is replaced by any real function. In the password setting, it is even worse since a minor weakness of the real function might open the door to a dictionary attack. The first solution without random oracle was due to Goldreich and Lindell [14] . Actually, their protocol was based on a general assumption only (i.e., the existence of trapdoor permutation). But this solution is very inefficient. A reasonably efficient construction in CRS model without random oracle was proposed by Katz, et al. [18] . We shall refer to this as the KOY protocol. An abstract framework for this protocol was proposed by Gennaro and Lindell [13] . Nevertheless, these protocols do not support mutual authentication (MA). Katz, et al. mentioned in their paper that a mutual authentication can be made by adding an additional flow. This is indeed true. However, the resulting protocol is then 4-round. It is known that a high entropy secret based KE protocol with MA is optimally 3-round. Thus, it is quite interesting to ask whether there exists such a protocol in the password setting without random oracles.
Contribution
In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to the above problem with an explicit construction. Our construction is in the CRS model (as in [13, 18] ), where all the parties have access to a set of public parameters drawn from a predetermined distribution, but nobody knows the corresponding secret key if any. Our construction is optimally 3-round. Comparing with work in [13, 18] , it additionally supports mutual authentication and is also simpler than KOY protocol in the sense of exponentiation cost. Nevertheless, their work has been instructive to us. In fact, one technique in their construction helps us in authenticating the initiator. As our important contribution, we formally prove the security under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption (without random oracles).
Security Model
In this section, we introduce a formal model of security. This model is mainly adopted from Bellare, et al. [2] and [3] . Our difference is in the mutual authentication where we feel our definition is more reasonable. Details are provided later. The basic security model without MA was previously adopted by Katz, et al. [18] and Gennaro and Lindell [13] . We start with the following notations, which will be used throughout the paper.
− D: a password dictionary with a polynomial size (otherwise, it becomes a KE problem with high entropy secrets). WOLG, we assume that D = {1, · · · , N } with a uniform distribution for some N > 0. − P i : party i, either a client or a server. If it is a server, then it could individually share a password with a set of clients. − Π l i i : protocol instance l i within party P i . We require that l i be unique within P i in order to distinguish local instances. However, we do not require it is globally unique, which reflects the practical concern for possible independence of different parties. − F low i : The ith message exchanged between two particular instances. 
Adversarial Model. Roughly speaking, the adversary is allowed to fully control the external network. He can inject, modify, block and delete messages at will. He can also request any session keys adaptively. Formally, he can adaptively query the following oracles.
• 2 . The oracle call reflects a threat from man-in-the-middle attack.
• Reveal(i, l i ) : When this oracle is called, it outputs the session key of instance Π l i i if it has accepted and completed with a session key derived; otherwise, it outputs ⊥. This oracle reflects the threat from a session key loss.
• Test(i, l i ) : This oracle does not reflect any real concern. However, it provides a security test.
The adversary is allowed to query it once. The queried session must be completed and accepted. Having defined adversary behavior, we come to define the protocol security. It contains two conditions: correctness and privacy. The mutual authentication is considered in the privacy condition.
Correctness. If two partnered instances both accept, then they conclude with the same session key except for a negligible probability. j indeed exists, then we require it is unique except for a negligible probability. If the above event does not happen but the adversary succeeds in the test session, we also announce its success.
We use random variable Succ to denote the above success events. We define the advantage of adversary A as Adv(A):= 2 Pr[Succ] − 1. Now we are ready to provide a formal definition of security.
Definition 1. A password authenticated key exchange protocol with mutual authentication is said to be secure if it satisfies
• Correctness.
• Privacy.
If adversary A makes Q send queries to Send oracle, then
where D is the password dictionary, n is the security parameter.
Remarks. Here we give two comments on our definition and that in [2] .
1. From our first privacy condition, whenever an instance Π i accepts are not tampered. This is indeed our intuition about "Π l j j is authenticated". 2. In Bellare, et al. [2] , MA is said to be violated if one instance terminates while no partner instance exists. This definition is not always satisfactory. Indeed, session identifier sid
i is popularly [13, 18] defined as a complete transcript seen by Π l i i . Under this SID, their version of MA is always violated since once the adversary holds on the last message the partnership is never established. However, this problem does not occur for our version of MA since we only consider the messages exchanged before the considered instance (i.e., Π l i i ) accepts and completes. We stress that a provable MA property of a particular protocol in [2] does not contradict our remark here since their SID is defined as a partial transcript. 3. As pointed out in [11] , our definition of MA could overkill some secure protocols. Consider any (secure) protocol Σ. We append 0 to each message in the Σ protocol but the protocol action remains unchanged (i.e., the redundant bit is ignored). It is easy to see that the revised protocol is no longer secure according to our definition of MA. Thus, a more concise MA should be defined to be a match of the minimal sub-transcript that uniquely determines the session key. However, we keep our definition. The reasons are as follows. First, our definition seems more natural and it is waived of a problem to determine the min-sub-transcript. Second, the overkilled protocol seems only due to the redundant bits which thus can be removed. Third, a protocol secure under our definition is also secure under the concise definition (since the first privacy condition (i.e, MA) in the latter is violated then it is violated in the former too).
Our Protocol
In this section, we introduce our 3-round construction under the common reference string (CRS) model, where all the parties have access to the public parameters that are drawn from a predetermined distribution. In reality, this condition could be realized by a trusted third party or a threshold scheme. Assume p, q are large primes with q|(p − 1); G q is the (unique) multiplicative subgroup of F * p of order q; g, h are uniformly random generators of G q ; H is a collision resistant hash function; e ← GenP K(1 n ) is the public key for a chosen ciphertext attack (in the postprocessing model) (CCA2) secure public key cryptosystem E (we stress that nobody knows the secret key of E e ); F is a pseudorandom function family and its realization with secret key σ is denoted by F σ (). Our protocol is presented as Figure 1 . Assume that password π ij is ideally shared between party P i and
HEip q § Fig. 1 . Key Exchange Protocol Execution between Pi and Pj P j . In order to establish a session key, P i and P j interact as follows. Assume P i speaks first. He picks x ← Z q uniformly, computes a plain ElGalmal ciphertext A|C and sends it together with id P i to P j as F low 1 . When P j receives F low 1 , he chooses λ 1 , λ 2 ← Z q , and computes µ, C , σ, r, ω, Σ properly, where r is used as the random input in encryption of Σ, and if it requires a longer string, r can be defined as F σ (3)|F σ (4)| · · · until it is long enough. We prefer the simple case since the security proof under this modification is essentially identical. Then he sends µ|ω|P j back to P i (as F low 2 ). Using µ, P i is able to compute σ since σ = µ x . Then he verifies whether ω is a ciphertext of H(µ|A|C |P j |P i ) using random bits r. If the verification is successful, then he believes P j is authentic and therefore returns an authentication tag τ = F σ (2) as F low 3 . Furthermore, he outputs a session key sk = F σ (1) and terminates. When P j receives τ , he checks whether τ is correct. If the verification succeeds, he believes P i is authentic. Therefore, he accepts and outputs a session key sk = F σ (1) . If the verification fails, it rejects. Note in the above interaction, implementation issues (e.g., a validity check whether appropriate elements belong to G q ) are omitted for simplicity.
Comparison with KOY Protocol
Now we provide a more detailed comparison with KOY protocol. As mentioned before, KOY protocol does not support MA, or it is 4-round if an additional flow is added. In contrast, our protocol is 3-round with MA. Each party in their construction needs 15 exps while ours needs at most 4 exps plus one ciphertext of a CCA2-secure PKE(note it is easy to find such a PKE with a ciphertext cost less than 11 exps). Their construction employs a one-time signature to "bind" the whole transcript while we do not use such a technique since it requires the responsor to store the whole transcript, which might be more vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attack. However, we stress their construction is instructive to us. Specifically, in authentication of initiator, we use a technique that if A|C is not an ElGamal ciphertext of g π ij , then σ is uniformly random in G q . This technique is essentially from KOY protocol with a relaxation of Cramer-Shoup ciphertext [10] to ElGamal ciphertext.
Security
In this section, we prove the security of our protocol. . Thus, the correctness follows. In the rest, we concentrate on the proof of the privacy condition. We look the protocol execution as a game between a simulator and an adversary A. The simulator picks large prime p, q with q|(p−1) and takes
, F a pseudorandom function family from {0, 1} b to {0, 1} c and H uniformly from a family of a collision resistant hash function (CRHF). He lets h = g u . Then he sets the public parameters as g, h, H, F, e, p, q and assigns passwords to parties as in the real protocol. He simulates the protocol execution with adversary A.
We construct a sequence of slightly modified protocols Γ 1 , Γ 2 , · · · from Γ and show that the success probability of A in Γ i is no less than that in Γ i−1 except for a negligible gap for any i ≥ 1, where Γ 0 := Γ. And then we bound the success probability of A in the last variant. Before our actual proof, we assume that in response to any oracle query, the basic validity check in its definition has already been successfully verified thus the output is never ⊥.
For given two parties P i and P j with common password π ij , we say A|C is inconsistent if log g A = log h Cg −π ij . We first introduce the following simple fact, where the proof is mainly due to the fact that λ 1 , λ 2 are both uniform in Z q (independent of anything else).
Fact 1 If A|C is inconsistent, then σ is uniformly random in G q , given A|C|µ where σ and µ are derived according to the responsor's execution.
Game Γ 1 . Now we modify Γ 0 to Γ 1 with the only difference in Execute query, where C in Γ 1 is chosen uniformly random. Using a hybrid argument or a better proof similar to Lemma 2 in [18] , both with reduction to DDH assumption, we have Lemma 1. Under DDH assumption in G q , the success probabilities of A in Γ and Γ 1 are negligibly close.
We modify Γ 1 to Γ 2 with only difference in Execute queries where r, τ and sk
are chosen uniformly random from {0, 1} 3c . Note A|C is inconsistent in Execute queries of Γ 1 (and Γ 2 ) except for a negligible probability. By Fact 1, one can conclude the following lemma using a standard hybrid argument with reduction to the pseudorandomness of F. Game Γ 3 . Now we modify Γ 2 to Γ 3 with the only difference in computing ω in Execute query, where Simulator picks C * ← G q randomly and defines ω = E e (H(µ|A|C * |P j |P i ); r) instead of a ciphertext of Σ = H(µ|A|C |P j |P i ). Here r is uniformly random (as in Γ 2 ). By a standard hybrid argument with reduction to the semantic security 3 of cryptosystem E (note the challenge template should be set according to the above modification), we have the following lemma. Game Γ 4 .
Till now, we have finished modifying Execute oracle. Next, let us consider Send oracle. Before that, we introduce some notations. We say that a message is adversary-generated if it is not exactly equal to the output of a Send oracle or a F low in a response of an Execute oracle; otherwise, we say it is an oracle-generated message. Consider any query Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ). If there exists Send(1, j, l j , A|C|P i ) such that it outputs µ|ω|P j and that A|C|P i is exactly the output of Send(0, i, l i , null), then we say that Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ) matches with Send(1, j, l j , A|C|P i ); otherwise, we say that a none-match event happens to Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ). Now we modify Γ 3 to Γ 4 with the only difference: upon any query Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ), if a none-match event happens to it (note Simulator can check this since it controls all the oracles), then deciding accept/reject only depends on whether ω can be decrypted to Σ = H(µ|A|C |P j |P i ) or not, where A|C| is in the output of Send(0, i, l i , null) and C = Cg −π ij . If it accepts in this case, it announces the success of A and halts. Note in case of a match event it responses as in Γ 3 .
Lemma 4.
The success probability of A in Γ 4 is no less than that in Γ 3 .
Proof. Note in case of a none-match event, if Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ) in Γ 4 rejects, then it rejects in Γ 3 too. Therefore, before a none-match event is accepted in Γ 4 , adversary view in Γ 4 is identically distributed as that in Γ 3 . On the other hand, an accepted none-match event in Γ 4 already announces the success of A. Thus, the conclusion follows.
Game Γ 5 . Now we modify Γ 4 to Γ 5 such that C in any send(0, i, l i , null) is taken uniformly random from G q . In order of consistency (in view of A), we need to take care of other oracle definitions. Send(1, j, l j , M ) remains unchanged. Since there does not exist x in A|C such that the normal action can be executed, Send(2, i, l i , A|C|P j ) is modified as follows. i) If there exists a unique l j such that Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ) matches with Send (1, j, l j , M ) , then it accepts (without verification of ω) and computes τ = F σ (2) using σ defined in Send(1, j, l j , M ). Then, he outputs τ and defines the session key sk
. If there are two or more l j , l j , · · · such that the above match event holds simultaneously (in the future, we call it a multi-match event), then it chooses one match randomly and follows the same procedure. ii) If a none-match event happens to Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ), then it responses as in Γ 4 (i.e. it decrypts ω, and decides to announce the success of A or to reject).
The Send(3, j, l j , M ) answers normally. The rest oracles remain unchanged (note the validity follows from the fact that their actions do not depend on the above modification). Proof. To relate Γ 4 and Γ 5 , we define a slightly modified Γ 4 as Γ 4 . The only difference is that in case of a match event in Γ 4 , Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P i ) responses as i) in definition of Γ 5 . On the one hand, if l j is always unique (whenever a match event happens), then adversary views in Γ 4 and Γ 4 are identically distributed since a unique match event is always accepted in Γ 4 . On the other hand, the probability that a multi-match event happens throughout the simulation is negligible since µ is uniform in G q . Thus, the success probabilities of A in Γ 4 and Γ 4 are negligibly close. Notice that executions of Games Γ 4 and Γ 5 are different only in that C is real or random. Thus, if the conclusion were wrong, a standard hybrid argument directly would reduce to break DDH assumption, a contradiction. Details are omitted.
Game Γ 6 . Now we modify Γ 5 to Γ 6 with the only difference in oracle Send(1, j, l j , A|C|P i ). If A|C is consistent: C = A u g π ij , it announces the success of adversary A and exits (recall Simulator knows u := log g h; recall normally C = A u g π ij since C is chosen uniformly random in oracle Send(0, * , * , null)); otherwise, it answers normally (as in Γ 5 ). The rest oracle definitions remain unchanged as in Γ 5 . Note this modification only increases the success probability of A. Indeed, if A|C is always inconsistent, then the adversary view in Γ 6 is identically distributed as in Γ 5 ; otherwise, A already succeeds in Γ 6 . Thus, we have Lemma 6. The success probability of A in Γ 6 is no less than that in Γ 5 .
Γ 7 is modified from Γ 6 as follows. In order to answer oracle
. Other oracle definitions remain unchanged as in Γ 6 (here the validity is due to the fact that the state information λ 1 , λ 2 is not required in these oracle definitions). Proof. Whenever σ is defined in Γ 6 (and Γ 7 ), this implies that A is not announced to succeed in Send(1, j, l j , A|C|P i ) and thus A|C is inconsistent. Thus, from Fact 1, the adversary view in Γ 6 and Γ 7 is identically distributed. The conclusion follows immediately.
Game Γ 8 . Now we modify Γ 7 to Γ 8 with the only difference: (r, τ, sk Proof. Consider a slightly modified Γ 7 , denoted as Γ 7 . Oracle definitions in Game Γ 7 are identical to those in Γ 8 except that (r, τ, sk
. We show that the success probabilities of A in Γ 7 and Γ 7 are negligibly close. Indeed, for Send(1, * , * , * ) and Send(2, * , * , * ), adversary views in Γ 7 and Γ 7 are identical since their outgoing messages are computed from the same definitions. When Send(3, j, l j , τ ) in Γ 7 is called, there are two cases.
Case 1:
A tuple (µ, * , * , * , j) is found: Suppose such a tuple is recorded by Send(2, i, l i , µ|ω|P j ), based on the match with Send(1, j, l j , M ). Then since µ is uniform in G q , it follows l j = l j except for a negligible probability. Thus, the decision based on τ = τ (= F σ (2) ) is well consistent with that in Γ 7 except for a negligible probability.
Case 2:
The tuple (µ, * , * , * , j) is not found: We show that the probability of wrong decision (i.e., τ = F σ (2)) is negligible. If this is incorrect, we build a distinguisher D 7 for F. Let η 7 be the upper bound of the number of Send(1, * , * , * ) queries. D 7 simulates Γ 7 as done by Simulator except for lth query Send(1, j, , l j , M ), where r is provided by his function oracle O with input 3. If at some moment, A makes a query Send(2, * , * , µ|ω|P j ) that matches with Send(1, j, l j , M ), then D 7 terminates the simulation and outputs 0, 1 randomly. When Send(3, j, l j , τ ) is called, D 7 first looks up (µ, * , * , * , j) in his memory. If it is found, then it terminates the simulation and outputs 0, 1 equally likely; otherwise, it feeds 2 to O and gets back τ. In this case, if τ = τ , then he outputs 1; otherwise, he outputs 0. If O = F, adversary view in the simulation by D 7 is identically distributed as that in Γ 7 since σ in Γ 7 (and Γ 7 ) is uniformly random from G q (thus the function oracle outputs are perfectly consistent with Γ 7 ). An easy calculation shows that the probability A outputs 1 is
, where p 0 is the probability of the wrong rejection event. If O is purely random function family, then τ is uniform in {0, 1} c (independent of anything else). Thus, Send(3, j, l j , τ ) wrongly accepts with probability at most 2 −c (sufficient to consider τ = τ ). Thus, D 7 has a non-negligible advantage, contradiction.
Other oracle definitions in Γ 7 and Γ 7 are identical. Thus, the success probabilities of A in Γ 7 and Γ 7 are negligibly close. Furthermore, the success probabilities of A in Γ 7 and Γ 8 are negligibly close, because their executions are identical only except that (r, τ, sk and the challenger of D 9 and waiting for the collision to happen). Thus, µ = µ , A =Ã, C † = Cg −π st , t = j, s = i, except for a negligible probability. If C † = Cg π ij , then C =C thus Send(2, s, l s , µ |ω |P t ) in fact matches with Send(1, j, l j , A|C|P i ), contradiction to the nonematch assumption for the former. If C † = C * a random in G q , thenCg −πst = C † holds only with negligible probability. Thus, as a summary, the decision is wrong only with a negligible probability.
The rest oracles are answered normally as in Γ 8 (or Γ 9 ) since no decryption is required any more. Thus, in case ω * is a ciphertext of Σ, then adversary view in the simulation is negligibly close to that in Γ (l−1) 8
; otherwise it is negligibly close to Γ
8 . Thus, a correct guess for z, which is nonnegligible, immediately implies non-negligible advantage of D 9 , a contradiction.
As a summary, the success probability of adversary in Test session is exactly 1 2 . Let α be the probability of ITri event. Then the total success probability of adversary is α+(1−α)
Proof of Theorem 1
Summarizing the results in Lemmas 1-9 and success probability of A in Γ 9 , we have Adv(A) < Q send |D| + negl(n). ♠
